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sLoad launches version 2.0, Starslord

January 21st, 2020 No comments

sLoad, the PowerShell-based Trojan downloader notable for its almost exclusive use of the Windows BITS service for malicious activities, has launched version 2.0. The new version comes on the heels of a comprehensive blog we published detailing the malware’s multi-stage nature and use of BITS as alternative protocol for data exfiltration and other behaviors.

With the new version, sLoad has added the ability to track the stage of infection on every affected machine. Version 2.0 also packs an anti-analysis trick that could identify and isolate analyst machines vis-à-vis actual infected machines.

We’re calling the new version “Starslord” based on strings in the malware code, which has clues indicating that the name “sLoad” may have been derived from a popular comic book superhero.

We discovered the new sLoad version over the holidays, in our continuous monitoring of the malware. New sLoad campaigns that use version 2.0 follow an attack chain similar to the previous version, with some updates, including dropping the dynamic list of command-and-control (C2) servers and upload of screenshots.

Tracking the stage of infection

With the ability to track the stage of infection, malware operators with access to the Starslord backend could build a detailed view of infections across affected machines and segregate these machines into different groups.

The tracking mechanism exists in the final-stage, which, as with the old version, loops infinitely (with sleep interval of 2400 seconds, higher than the 1200 seconds in version 1.0). In line with the previous version, at every iteration of the final stage, the malware uses a download BITS job to exfiltrate stolen system information and receive additional payloads from the active C2 server.

As we noted in our previous blog, creating a BITS job with an extremely large RemoteURL parameter that includes non-encrypted system information, as the old sLoad version did, stands out and is relatively easy to detect. However, with Starslord, the system information is encoded into Base64 data before being exfiltrated.

The file received by Starslord in response to the exfiltration BITS job contains a tuple of three values separated by an asterisk (*):

  • Value #1 is a URL to download additional payload using a download BITS job
  • Value #2 specifies the action, which can be any of the following, to be taken on the payload downloaded from the URL in value#1:
    • “eval” – Run (possibly very large) PowerShell scripts
    • “iex” – Load and invoke (possibly small) PowerShell code
    • “run” – Download encoded PE file, decode using exe, and run the decoded executable
  • Value #3 is an integer that can signify the stage of infection for the machine

Supplying the payload URL as part of value #1 allows the malware infrastructure to house additional payloads on different servers from the active C2 servers responding to the exfiltration BITS jobs.

Value#3 is the most noteworthy component in this setup. If the final stage succeeds in downloading additional payload using the URL provided in value #1 and executing it as specified by the command in value #2, then a variable is used to form the string “td”:”<value#3>”,”tds”:”3”. However, if the final stage fails to download and execute the payload, then the string formed is “td”:”<value #3>”,”tds”:”4”.

The infinite loop ensures that the exfiltration BITS jobs are created at a fixed interval. The backend infrastructure can then pick up the pulse from each infected machine. However, unlike the previous version, Starslord includes the said string in succeeding iterations of data exfiltration. This means that the malware infrastructure is always aware of the exact stage of the infection for a specific affected machine. In addition, since the numeric value for value #3 in the tuple is always governed by the malware infrastructure, malware operators can compartmentalize infected hosts and could potentially set off individual groups on unique infection paths. For example, when responding to exfiltration BITS jobs, malware operators can specify a different URL (value #1) and action (value #2) for each numeric value for value #3 of the tuple, essentially deploying a different malware payload for different groups.

Anti-analysis trap

Starslord comes built-in with a function named checkUniverse, which is in-fact an anti-analysis trap.

As mentioned in our previous blog post, the final stage of sLoad is a piece of PowerShell code obtained by decoding one of the dropped .ini files. The PowerShell code appears in the memory as a value assigned to a variable that is then executed using the Invoke-Expression cmdlet. Because this is a huge piece of decrypted PowerShell code that never hits the disk, security researchers would typically dump it into a file on the disk for further analysis.

The sLoad dropper PowerShell script drops four files:

  • a randomly named .tmp file
  • a randomly named .ps1 file
  • a ini file
  • a ini file

It then creates a scheduled task to run the .tmp file every 3 minutes, similar to the previous version. The .tmp file is a proxy that does nothing but run the .ps1 file, which decrypts the contents of main.ini into the final stage. The final stage then decrypts contents of domain.ini to obtain active C2 and perform other activities as documented.

As a unique anti-analysis trap, Starslord ensures that the .tmp and.ps1 files have the same random name. When an analyst dumps the decrypted code of the final stage into a file in the same folder as the .tmp and .ps1 files, the analyst could end up naming it something other than the original random name. When this dumped code is run from such differently named file on the disk, a function named checkUniverse returns the value 1, and the analyst gets trapped:

What comes next is not very desirable for a security researcher: being profiled by the malware operator.

If the host belongs to a trapped analyst, the file downloaded from the backend in response to the exfiltration BITS job, if any, is discarded and overwritten by the following new tuple:

hxxps://<active C2>/doc/updx2401.jpg*eval*-1

In this case, the value #1 of the tuple is a URL that’s known to the backend for being associated with trapped hosts. BITS jobs from trapped hosts don’t always get a response. If they do, it’s a copy of the dropper PowerShell script. This could be to create an illusion that the framework is being updated as the URL in value #1 of the tuple suggests (hxxps://<active C2>/doc/updx2401.jpg).

However, the string that is included in all successive exfiltration BITS jobs from such host is “td”:”-1”,”tds”:”3”, eventually leading to all such hosts getting grouped under value “td”:”-1”. This forms the group of all trapped machines that are never delivered a payload. For the rest, so far, evidence suggests that it has been delivering the file infector Ramnit intermittently.

Durable protection against evolving malware

sLoad’s multi-stage attack chain, use of mutated intermediate scripts and BITS as an alternative protocol, and its polymorphic nature in general make it a piece malware that can be quite tricky to detect. Now, it has evolved into a new and polished version Starlord, which retains sLoads most basic capabilities but does away with spyware capabilities in favor of new and more powerful features, posing even higher risk.

Starslord can track and group affected machines based on the stage of infection, which can allow for unique infection paths. Interestingly, given the distinct reference to a fictional superhero, these groups can be thought of as universes in a multiverse. In fact, the malware uses a function called checkUniverse to determine if a host is an analyst machine.

Microsoft Threat Protection defends customers from sophisticated and continuously evolving threats like sLoad using multiple industry-leading security technologies that protect various attack surfaces. Through signal-sharing across multiple Microsoft services, Microsoft Threat Protection delivers comprehensive protection for identities, endpoints, data, apps, and infrastructure.

On endpoints, behavioral blocking and containment capabilities in Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Microsoft Defender ATP) ensure durable protection against evolving threats. Through cloud-based machine learning and data science informed by threat research, Microsoft Defender ATP can spot and stop malicious behaviors from threats, both old and new, in real-time.

 

 

Sujit Magar

Microsoft Defender ATP Research Team

The post sLoad launches version 2.0, Starslord appeared first on Microsoft Security.

Multi-stage downloader Trojan sLoad abuses BITS almost exclusively for malicious activities

December 12th, 2019 No comments

Many of today’s threats evolve to incorporate as many living-off-the-land techniques as possible into the attack chain. The PowerShell-based downloader Trojan known as sLoad, however, puts all its bets on BITS.

Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a component of the Windows operating system that provides an ability to transfer files in an asynchronous and throttled fashion using idle bandwidth. Abusing BITS, which provides the ability to create self-contained jobs that can be prioritized and queued up and that can launch other programs, has become a prevalent attack technique. Recent sophisticated malware campaigns like Astaroth have found success in the use of BITS for downloading payloads or additional components, especially in systems where the firewall is not configured to block malicious traffic from BITS jobs.

sLoad, detected by Windows Defender Antivirus as TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/sLoad, is used by adversaries for exfiltrating system information and delivering additional payloads in targeted attacks. It has been around for a few years and has not stopped evolving. What hasn’t changed, though, is its use of BITS for all of its exfiltration activities, as well as command-and-control (C2) communications from handshake to downloading additional payloads.

Once sLoad has infiltrated a machine, it can allow attackers to do further, potentially more damaging actions. Using exfiltrated information, attackers can identify what security solutions are running and test payloads before they are sneaked into the compromised system or, worse, high-priced targets. sLoad uses scheduled tasks, which runs the malware every three minutes, opening the window of opportunity for further compromise—hence raising the risk for the affected machine—every time it runs. We have already seen the malware attempt to deliver several other, potentially more dangerous Trojans to compromised machines.

While several malware campaigns have leveraged BITS, sLoad’s almost exclusive use of the service is notable. sLoad uses BITS as an alternative protocol to perform data exfiltration and most of its other malicious activities, enabling the malware to evade defenders and protections that may not be inspecting this unconventional protocol. Cloud-based machine learning-driven behavioral blocking and containment capabilities in Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection detect and block sLoad’s activities as Behavior:Win32/sLoad.A.

In this blog we’ll share our analysis of the multiple ways in which sLoad is abusing BITS and share how Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection defeats these advanced malware techniques.

Stealthy installation via multiple cascaded scripts

sLoad is known to infect machines using spear-phishing emails and a common but effective detection evasion technique: the cascaded scripts. One script drops or downloads one or more scripts, passes control to one of these scripts, and repeats the process multiple times until the final component is installed.

Over time, we’ve seen some variations of this technique. One sLoad campaign used the link target field of a LNK file to run PowerShell commands that extracts and runs the first-stage PowerShell code, which is appended to the end of the LNK file or, in one instance, the end of the ZIP file that originally contained the LNK file. In another campaign, the first-stage PowerShell code itself uses a download BITS job to download either the sLoad script and the C2 URL file or the sLoad dropper PowerShell script that embeds the encrypted sLoad script and C2 URL file within itself.

In the most recent attacks, for the first stage, sLoad shifted from using PowerShell script to VBScript. The randomly named VBScript file is simply a proxy that builds and then drops and runs a PowerShell script, always named rr.ps1. This is none other than the same sLoad PowerShell dropper mentioned earlier that embeds the encrypted sLoad script and C2 URL file within itself.

In most variations of the installation, the sLoad dropper script is the last intermediate stage that performs the following actions, and eventually decrypts and runs the final sLoad script:

  1. Creates an installation folder in the %APPDATA% folder named after the first 6 characters of the Win32 Product UUID. 
  2. Drops an infection marker file named _in, and during the successive executions, uses the LastWriteTime on this file to check whether the malware is installed within last 30 mins, in which case, it terminates. 
  3. Drops the encrypted sLoad script and the C2 URL file as config.ini and web.ini, respectively. 
  4. Builds and drops two more randomly named scripts: one VBScript and one PowerShell script. 
  5. Uses schtasks.exe to create a scheduled task named AppRunLog to run the randomly named VBScript from the previous step with decryption key supplied as a command line parameter; deletes the previously created related tasks (if found) before creating this one. The scheduled task is configured to start at 7:00 AM and run every 3 mins. 

The dropped VBScript that runs under the scheduled task is yet another proxy that simply runs the dropped PowerShell script with the same command line parameter (the decryption key). The PowerShell script decrypts the contents of the previously dropped config.ini in the memory into another piece of PowerShell code, which it then runs. This is the final component, the script detected as TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/sLoad, that uses BITS to perform every important malicious activity.

BITS abuse

The sLoad PowerShell script (the final component) then abuses BITS to carry out all of the following activities:

Finding an active C2 server

The malware decrypts the contents of previously dropped web.ini into a set of 2 URLs and creates a BITS download jobs to test the connection to these URLs. It then saves the URL that responds in the form of a file that contains a message “sok”, being downloaded as part of created BITS job. This ensures that the handshake is complete.

If none responds, the script appends the number “1” to the domain names in both URLs, saves the encrypted data back to the web.ini file, and exits from the script. As a result, the next time the scheduled job runs, the script uses the modified web.ini to obtain the modified URLs to attempt connecting to an active C2. With each unsuccessful attempt of connecting with C2s, the number appended to the domain names is increased by increments of 1 until it reaches 50, at which time it resets to 1. This technique offers a bit of a cushion and ensures continued contact between a compromised machine and a C2, in case the primary C2 is blocked.

This prevents the malware infrastructure from losing a compromised host if the primary C2 is blocked. It’s also interesting to see how the URLs used to reach C2 are structured to appear related to CAPTCHA verification, an attempt to escape watchful eyes.

Fetching a new list of C2s

For continued exfiltration of information, it’s important to maintain contact with an active C2. As the malicious domains cannot stay up running for a long time, the malware packs a functionality to refresh the list of C2 every time the scheduled task runs. Using a BITS download job, the malware downloads a new copy of web.ini from the active C2 to provisions a new set of C2s for future use.

Exfiltrating system information

Once an active C2 is identified, the malware starts collecting system information by performing the following:

  • saves the output of “net view” command
  • enumerates network drives and saves the provider names and device ids
  • produces the list of all running processes
  • obtains the OS caption
  • looks for Outlook folder, as well as Independent Computing Architecture (ICA) files, which are used by Citrix application servers to store configuration information

It then creates a BITS download job with the RemoteURL built using the URL for active C2 and the system information collected up this point.

Crafting URLs infused with stolen info is not a novel attacker technique. In addition, creating a BITS job with an extremely large RemoteURL parameter that includes non-encrypted system information stands out and is relatively easy to detect. However, this malware’s use of a download job instead of an upload job is a clever move to achieve stealth.

Deploying additional payloads

Because the malware exfiltrates system information using a BITS download job, it gets an opportunity to receive a response in the form of a file downloaded to the machine. It uses this opportunity to obtain additional payloads from the C2.

It sleeps and waits for the file to be downloaded. If the downloaded file instructs to download and invoke additional PowerShell codes, the supplied URL is used for the task. If not, then the URL is assumed to be pointing to an encoded PE image payload. The malware creates another BITS download job to download this payload, creates a copy of this newly downloaded encoded file, and uses another Windows utility, certutil.exe, to decode it into a portable executable (PE) file with .exe extension. Finally, it uses PowerShell.exe to run the decoded PE payload. One more BITS download job is created to download additional files.

Spying

The malware comes built with one of the most notorious spyware features: uploading screenshots. At several stages during the installation as well as when running additional payloads, the malware takes several screenshots at short intervals. It then uses a BITS upload job to send the stolen screenshots to the active C2. This is the only time that it uses an upload job, and these are the only files it uploads to the C2. Once uploaded, the screenshots are deleted from the machine.

Conclusion: Multiple layers of protection against multi-stage living-off-the-land threats

sLoad is just one example of the increasingly more prevalent threats that can perform most of their malicious activities by simply living off the land. In this case, it’s a dangerous threat that’s equipped with notorious spyware capabilities, infiltrative payload delivery, and data exfiltration capabilities. sLoad’s behavior can be classified as a Type III fileless technique: while it drops some malware files during installation, its use of only BITS jobs to perform most of its harmful behaviors and scheduled tasks for persistence achieves an almost fileless presence on compromised machines.

To defeat multi-stage, stealthy, and persistent threats like sLoad, Microsoft Defender ATP’s antivirus component uses multiple next-generation protection engines on the client and in the cloud. While most threats are identified and stopped by many of these engines, behavioral blocking and containment capabilities detects malicious behaviors and blocks threats after they have started running:

These detections are also surfaced in Microsoft Defender Security Center. Security operations teams can then use Microsoft Defender ATP’s other capabilities like endpoint detection and response (EDR), automated investigation and response, Threat and Vulnerability Management, and Microsoft Threat Experts to investigate and respond to attacks. This reflects the defense-in-depth strategy that is central to the unified endpoint protection provided by Microsoft Defender ATP.

As part of Microsoft Threat Protection, Microsoft Defender ATP shares security signals about this threat to other security services, which likewise inform and enrich endpoint protection. For example, Office 365 ATP’s intelligence on the emails that carry sLoad is shared to and used by Microsoft Defender ATP to build even stronger defenses at the source of infection. Real-time signal-sharing across Microsoft’s security services gives Microsoft Threat Protection unparalleled visibility across attack vectors and the unique ability to provide comprehensive protection against identities, endpoints, data, cloud apps, and infrastructure.

 

Sujit Magar
Microsoft Defender ATP Research Team

 

 


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The post Multi-stage downloader Trojan sLoad abuses BITS almost exclusively for malicious activities appeared first on Microsoft Security.

Financial Services: A Survey of the State of Secure Application Development Processes

September 17th, 2013 No comments

The financial services industry is one of the world’s largest industries by monetary value, and an industry which has a direct impact on the lives of billions of people around the world. Organizations in the financial services industry handle trillions of transactions each year involving sensitive information about individuals, companies, and other third parties. To help protect this sensitive information it is important that financial services organizations are developing, procuring, and using software applications that have been developed with security in mind.

Microsoft commissioned an independent research and consultancy firm, The Edison Group, to examine the current state of application development in the financial services sector from a security perspective. Their report – Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle Adoption: Why and How – is available today.
The paper was developed following in-depth interviews with Chief Security Officers and senior executives representing some of the leading banks and financial services companies in the United States. Some highlights from the paper..  Read more

…(read more)

BRANCHCACHE for Exchange 2010 OAB Download How-To:

BRANCHCACHE for Exchange 2010 OAB Download How-To:

Requirements for BranchCache

Following is a list of operating systems that support BranchCache content server or BranchCache client computer functionality. To successfully deploy BranchCache in a test lab environment, you must use operating systems that support BranchCache.


General Requirements to Server and Client

Server and Clients must be able to communicate to each other. Clients must be in the same Subnet (otherwise Discovery of Cached Content will not work). All Machines must be able to resolvable in DNS or WINS.


Operating systems for BranchCache client computer functionality

To perform the steps in this guide, you must have three physical or virtual client computers that are running one of the following operating systems:

  • Windows® 7 Enterprise
  • Windows® 7 Ultimate

Operating systems for BranchCache content server functionality

To perform the steps in this guide, you must have one physical or virtual server computer to be used as a BranchCache content Web server that is running one of the Windows Server® 2008 R2 family of operating systems, with the following exceptions:

  • In Windows Server® 2008 R2 Enterprise Core Install with Hyper-V, BranchCache is not supported.
  • In Windows Server® 2008 R2 Datacenter Core Install with Hyper-V, BranchCache is not supported.

Necessary Installation and Configuration Steps for Content-Server:

In our Lab Environment the Content Server should deliver the Exchange OAB. In this case the
existing CAS-Server is responsible for the Content we want to get, so the CAS-Server will be our Content-server. As prerequisite for CAS the IIS-Server is in place so we don’t need to change anything at this point.

The first neccassary Step is to install the Branchcache Feature from Roles and Features.

After this is done install the B.I.T.S. feature with IIS Extension Subfeature.

At the Server this should be the needed configuration Steps.

Additionaly to verify the functionality you can use Perfmon to Monitor the Branchcache related traffic information.

 Configure BranchCache performance counters on the content server
 

  1. 1.   On CAS with Branchcache installed, click Start, click Search programs and files, and type perfmon. In Search results, in Programs, click perfmon.exe. Windows Performance Monitor opens.
  2. 2.   In Monitoring Tools click Performance Monitor to view the Performance Monitor graph. To change the performance monitor graph to report view, click the graph toolbar icon that displays an arrow to reveal the drop-down list, and then click Report.
  3. 3.   To add BranchCache counters, click the graph toolbar icon that is a green plus sign (+). The Add Counters dialog box opens. In the left pane, scroll to BranchCache Kernel Mode, and click to expand the list of BranchCache Kernel Mode counters. Click Client Cache Miss Bytes, hold down the Ctrl key, and then click Server Cache Miss Bytes, Hash Bytes, and Projected Server Bytes Without Caching.
  4. 4.   Click Add, and then click OK.

  Perfmon Content-Server with working Branchcache

 

 To reset the Branchcache functionallity and the performance counters on the content server use:

 

        Netsh branchcache reset

 

 After the Branchcache reset the Perfmon Counters are reset as well.

 Client computer configuration: 
 Neccessary Installation and Configuration Steps for Client Computers to enable BranchCache distributed cache mode using network shell commands

 

1.   On the BranchCache client computer that you want to configure, click Start, click Search programs and files, and then type command. In search results, under Programs, right-click Command Prompt, and then click Run as Administrator. The command prompt opens with the elevated privileges that are required to run netsh commands.

2.   Run the following command: netsh branchcache set service mode=DISTRIBUTED

Suggestion:

Running the netsh branchcache set service command both configures the client computer for distributed cache mode and automatically configures the client computer firewall with the following inbound exceptions for distributed cache mode: TCP port 80 and UDP port 3702.

3.   To verify that BranchCache distributed cache mode is correctly configured on the client computer, run the following command: netsh branchcache show status. The BranchCache Service Status is displayed in the command prompt window with the following values: Service Mode: Distributed Caching; Serve peers on battery power: Disabled; and Current Status= Running.

  

To configure BranchCache performance counters on the Client Computers
 

4.   On Client with Branchcache installed, click Start, click Search programs and files, and type perfmon. In Search results, in Programs, click perfmon.exe. Windows Performance Monitor opens.

5.   In Monitoring Tools click Performance Monitor to view the Performance Monitor graph. To change the performance monitor graph to report view, click the graph toolbar icon that displays an arrow to reveal the drop-down list, and then click Report.

6.   To add BranchCache counters, click the graph toolbar icon that is a green plus sign (+). The Add Counters dialog box opens. In the left pane, scroll to BranchCache, and select all underlying counters.

7.   Click Add, and then click OK.

 

  First Windows 7 Client got Data from Server                                                                                              Other Windows 7 Clients got Hashes from Server but Data from Cache of First Client

                                      

 

To reset the Branchcache functionallity and the performance counters on the Client machines use:

 

      netsh branchcache reset

 

and after that

 

       netsh branchcache set service mode=DISTRIBUTED

These are the steps to make OAB Download over Branchcache possible.