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A worthy upgrade: Next-gen security on Windows 10 proves resilient against ransomware outbreaks in 2017

January 10th, 2018 No comments

Adopting reliable attack methods and techniques borrowed from more evolved threat types, ransomware attained new levels of reach and damage in 2017. The following trends characterize the ransomware narrative in the past year:

  • Three global outbreaks showed the force of ransomware in making real-world impact, affecting corporate networks and bringing down critical services like hospitals, transportation, and traffic systems
  • Three million unique computers encountered ransomware; millions more saw downloader trojans, exploits, emails, websites and other components of the ransomware kill chain
  • New attack vectors, including compromised supply chain, exploits, phishing emails, and documents taking advantage of the DDE feature in Office were used to deliver ransomware
  • More than 120 new ransomware families, plus countless variants of established families and less prevalent ransomware caught by heuristic and generic detections, emerged from a thriving cybercriminal enterprise powered by ransomware-as-a-service

The trend towards increasingly sophisticated malware behavior, highlighted by the use of exploits and other attack vectors, makes older platforms so much more susceptible to ransomware attacks. From June to November, Windows 7 devices were 3.4 times more likely to encounter ransomware compared to Windows 10 devices. Considering that Windows 10 has a much larger install base than Windows 7, this difference in ransomware encounter rate is significant.

Figure 1. Ransomware encounter rates on Windows 7 and Windows 10 devices. Encounter rate refers to the percentage of computers running the OS version with Microsoft real-time security that blocked or detected ransomware.

The data shows that attackers are targeting Windows 7. Given todays modern threats, older platforms can be infiltrated more easily because these platforms dont have the advanced built-in end-to-end defense stack available on Windows 10. Continuous enhancements further make Windows 10 more resilient to ransomware and other types of attack.

Windows 10: Multi-layer defense against ransomware attacks

The year 2017 saw three global ransomware outbreaks driven by multiple propagation and infection techniques that are not necessarily new but not typically observed in ransomware. While there are technologies available on Windows 7 to mitigate attacks, Windows 10s comprehensive set of platform mitigations and next-generation technologies cover these attack methods. Additionally, Windows 10 S, which is a configuration of Windows 10 thats streamlined for security and performance, locks down devices against ransomware outbreaks and other threats.

In May, WannaCry (Ransom:Win32/WannaCrypt) caused the first global ransomware outbreak. It used EternalBlue, an exploit for a previously fixed SMBv1 vulnerability, to infect computers and spread across networks at speeds never before observed in ransomware.

On Windows 7, Windows AppLocker and antimalware solutions like Microsoft Security Essentials and System Center Endpoint Protection (SCEP) can block the infection process. However, because WannaCry used an exploit to spread and infect devices, networks with vulnerable Windows 7 devices fell victim. The WannaCry outbreak highlighted the importance of keeping platforms and software up-to-date, especially with critical security patches.

Windows 10 was not at risk from the WannaCry attack. Windows 10 has security technologies that can block the WannaCry ransomware and its spreading mechanism. Built-in exploit mitigations on Windows 10 (KASLR, NX HAL, and PAGE POOL), as well as kCFG (control-flow guard for kernel) and HVCI (kernel code-integrity), make Windows 10 much more difficult to exploit.

Figure 2. Windows 7 and Windows 10 platform defenses against WannaCry

In June, Petya (Ransom:Win32/Petya.B) used the same exploit that gave WannaCry its spreading capabilities, and added more propagation and infection methods to give birth to arguably the most complex ransomware in 2017. Petyas initial infection vector was a compromised software supply chain, but the ransomware quickly spread using the EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits, as well as a module for lateral movement using stolen credentials.

On Windows 7, Windows AppLocker can stop Petya from infecting the device. If a Windows 7 device is fully patched, Petyas exploitation behavior did not work. However, Petya also stole credentials, which it then used to spread across networks. Once running on a Windows 7 device, only an up-to-date antivirus that had protection in place at zero hour could stop Petya from encrypting files or tampering with the master boot record (MBR).

On the other hand, on Windows 10, Petya had more layers of defenses to overcome. Apart from Windows AppLocker, Windows Defender Application Control can block Petyas entry vector (i.e., compromised software updater running an untrusted binary), as well as the propagation techniques that used untrusted DLLs. Windows 10s built-in exploit mitigations can further protect Windows 10 devices from the Petya exploit. Credential Guard can prevent Petya from stealing credentials from local security authority subsystem service (LSASS), helping curb the ransomwares propagation technique. Meanwhile, Windows Defender System Guard (Secure Boot) can stop the MBR modified by Petya from being loaded at boot time, preventing the ransomware from causing damage to the master file table (MFT).

Figure 3. Windows 7 and Windows 10 platform defenses against Petya

In October, another sophisticated ransomware reared its ugly head: Bad Rabbit ransomware (Ransom:Win32/Tibbar.A) infected devices by posing as an Adobe Flash installer available for download on compromised websites. Similar to WannaCry and Petya, Bad Rabbit had spreading capabilities, albeit more traditional: it used a hardcoded list of user names and passwords. Like Petya, it can also render infected devices unbootable, because, in addition to encrypting files, it also encrypted entire disks.

On Windows 7 devices, several security solutions technologies can block the download and installation of the ransomware, but protecting the device from the damaging payload and from infecting other computers in the network can be tricky.

With Windows 10, however, in addition to stronger defense at the infection vector, corporate networks were safer from this damaging threat because several technologies are available to stop or detect Bad Rabbits attempt to spread across networks using exploits or hardcoded user names and passwords.

More importantly, during the Bad Rabbit outbreak, detonation-based machine learning models in Windows Defender AV cloud protection service, with no human intervention, correctly classified the malware 14 minutes after the very first encounter. The said detonation-based ML models are a part of several layers of machine learning and artificial intelligence technologies that evaluate files in order to reach a verdict on suspected malware. Using this layered approach, Windows Defender AV protected Windows 10 devices with cloud protection enabled from Bad Rabbit within minutes of the outbreak.

Figure 4. Windows 7 and Windows 10 platform defenses against Bad Rabbit

As these outbreaks demonstrated, ransomware has indeed become a highly complex threat that can be expected to continue evolving in 2018 and beyond. The multiple layers of next-generation security technologies on Windows 10 are designed to disrupt the attack methods that we have previously seen in highly specialized malware but now also see in ransomware.

Ransomware protection on Windows 10

For end users, the dreaded ransom note announces that ransomware has already taken their files hostage: documents, precious photos and videos, and other important files encrypted. On Windows 10 Fall Creators Update, a new feature helps stop ransomware from accessing important files in real-time, even if it manages to infect the computer. When enabled, Controlled folder access locks down folders, allowing only authorized apps to access files.

Controlled folder access, however, is but one layer of defense. Ransomware and other threats from the web can be blocked by Microsoft Edge, whose exploit mitigation and sandbox features make it a very secure browser. Microsoft Edge significantly improves web security by using Windows Defender SmartScreens reputation-based blocking of malicious downloads and by opening pages within low-privilege app containers.

Windows Defender Antivirus also continues to enhance defense against threats like ransomware. Its advanced generic and heuristic techniques and layered machine learning models help catch both common and rare ransomware families. Windows Defender AV can detect and block most malware, including never-before-seen ransomware, using generics and heuristics, local ML models, and metadata-based ML models in the cloud. In rare cases that a threat slips past these layers of protection, Windows Defender AV can protect patient zero in real-time using analysis-based ML models, as demonstrated in a real-life case scenario where a customer was protected from a very new Spora ransomware in a matter of seconds. In even rarer cases of inconclusive initial classification, additional automated analysis and ML models can still protect customers within minutes, as what happened during the Bad Rabbit outbreak.

Windows 10 S locks down devices from unauthorized content by working exclusively with apps from the Windows Store and by using Microsoft Edge as the default browser. This streamlined, Microsoft-verified platform seals common entry points for ransomware and other threats.

Reducing the attack surface for ransomware and other threats in corporate networks

For enterprises and small businesses, the impact of ransomware is graver. Losing access to files can mean disrupted operations. Big enterprise networks, including critical infrastructures, fell victim to ransomware outbreaks. The modern enterprise network is under constant assault by attackers and needs to be defended on all fronts.

Windows Defender Exploit Guard locks down devices against a wide variety of attack vectors. Its host intrusion prevention capabilities include the following components, which block behaviors commonly used in malware attacks:

  • Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) is a set of controls that blocks common ransomware entry points: Office-, script-, and email-based threats that download and install ransomware; ASR can also protect from emerging exploits like DDEDownloader, which has been used to distribute ransomware
  • Network protection uses Windows Defender SmartScreen to block outbound connections to untrusted hosts, such as when trojan downloaders connect to a malicious server to obtain ransomware payloads
  • Controlled folder access blocks ransomware and other untrusted processes from accessing protected folders and encrypting files in those folders
  • Exploit protection (replacing EMET) provides mitigation against a broad set of exploit techniques that are now being used by ransomware authors

Additionally, the industry-best browser security in Microsoft Edge is enhanced by Windows Defender Application Guard, which brings Azure cloud grade isolation and security segmentation to Windows applications. This hardware isolation-level capability provides one of the highest levels of protection against zero-day exploits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and web-based malware.

For emails, Microsoft Exchange Online Protection (EOP) uses built-in anti-spam filtering capabilities that help protect Office 365 customers against ransomware attacks that begin with email. Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection helps secure mailboxes against email attacks by blocking emails with unsafe attachments, malicious links, and linked-to files leveraging time-of-click protection.

Integrated security for enterprises

Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection allows SecOps personnel to stop the spread of ransomware through timely detection of ransomware activity in the network. Windows Defender ATPs enhanced behavioral and machine learning detection libraries flag malicious behavior across the ransomware attack kill-chain, enabling SecOps to promptly investigate and respond to ransomware attacks.

With Windows 10 Fall Creators Update, Windows Defender ATP was expanded to include seamless integration across the entire Windows protection stack, including Windows Defender Exploit Guard, Windows Defender Application Guard, and Windows Defender AV. This integration is designed to provide a single pane of glass for a seamless security management experience.

With all of these security technologies, Microsoft has built the most secure Windows version ever with Windows 10. While the threat landscape will continue to evolve in 2018 and beyond, we dont stop innovating and investing in security solutions that continue to harden Windows 10 against attacks. The twice-per-year feature update release cycle reflects our commitment to innovate and to make it easier to disrupt successful attack techniques with new protection features. Upgrading to Windows 10 not only means decreased risk; it also means access to advanced, multi-layered defense against ransomware and other types of modern attacks.


Tanmay Ganacharya (@tanmayg)
Principal Group Manager, Windows Defender Research



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Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection defense for corporate networks against recent Office exploit attacks

November 21st, 2017 No comments

The Office 365 Threat Research team has seen an uptick in the use of Office exploits in attacks across various industry sectors in recent months. In this blog, we will review several of these exploits, including a group of Office moniker exploits that attackers have used in targeted as well as crimeware attacks. We will also describe the payloads associated with these exploits andhighlight our research into a particularly sophisticated piece of malware. Finally, we will demonstrate how Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection, Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection, and Windows Defender Exploit Guard protect customers from these exploits.

Exploit attacks in Fall 2017

The discovery and public availability of a few Office exploits in the last six months led to these exploits gaining popularity among crimeware and targeted attackers alike. While crimeware attackers stick to payloads like ransomware and info stealers to attain financial gain or information theft, more sophisticated attackers clearly distinguish themselves by using advanced and multi-stage implants.

The Office 365 Threat Research team has been closely monitoring these attacks. The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) backs up our threat research with premium threat intelligence services that we use to correlate and track attacks and the threat actors behind them.


CVE-2017-0199 is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Microsoft Office allows a remote attacker to take control of a vulnerable machine if the user chooses to ignore protected view warning message. The vulnerability, which is a logic bug in the URL moniker that executes the HTA content using the htafile OLE object, was fixed in April 2017 security updates.

Figure 1. CVE-2017-0199 exploit code

Ever since FireEye blogged about the vulnerability, we have identified numerous attacks using this exploit. The original exploit was used in limited targeted attacks, but soon after, commodity crimeware started picking them up from the publicly available exploit generator toolkits. As shown in Figure 2, the creator and lastModifiedBy attributes help identify the use of such toolkits in generating exploit documents.

Figure 2. Exploit kit identifier

A slight variation of this exploit, this time in script moniker, was also released. When activated, this exploit can launch scriptlets (which consist of HTML code and script) hosted on a remote server. A proof-of-concept (PoC) made publicly available used a Microsoft PowerPoint Slideshow (PPSX) file to activate the script moniker and execute a remote code, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. PPSX activation for script moniker


The July 2017 security update from Microsoft included a fix for another variation of the CVE-2017-0199 exploit, CVE-2017-8570, which was discovered in URL moniker that, similar to HTA files, can launch scriptlets hosted on a remote server. Even though the vulnerability was not exploited as zero-day, the public availability of exploit toolkit created a wave of malicious PPSX attachments.


In September 2017, FireEye discovered another exploit used in targeted attacks. The CVE-2017-8759 exploit takes advantage of a code injection vulnerability in .Net Framework while parsing WSDL definition using SOAP moniker. The vulnerability was fixed in the September 2017 security update. The original exploit used an HTA file similar to CVE-2017-0199 to execute the attacker code in vulnerable machines. This exploit piqued our interest because it delivered one of the most complex and multiple VM-layered malware, FinFisher, whose techniques we discuss in the succeeding section.

The CVE-2017-8759 exploit soon got ported to PPSX file. Figure 4 below shows an example of the exploit.

Figure 4. CVE-2017-8759 exploit


Finally, onSeptember 28,2017, Qihoo 360 identified an RTF file in targeted attacks that exploited a memory corruption vulnerability in Microsoft Office. The vulnerability exists in the way Office parses objects within nested Office tags and was fixed in the October 2017 security update. The forced address space layout randomization (ASLR) prevented the exploit from running in Office 2013 and above. Figure 5 shows the nested tags from the original exploit that led to the bug.

Figure 5. CVE-2017-11826 exploit


Except for the memory, corruption exploit CVE-2017-11826, the exploits discussed in this blog pull the malware payload from remote locations, which could make it difficult for antivirus and sandboxes to reliably detect these exploits. Additionally, the public availability of scripts that generate exploit templates could make it challenging for incident responders.

As cited above, these exploits were used in both commodity and targeted attacks. Attackers attempt to bypass AV engine defenses using different obfuscation techniques. Here are some of the obfuscation techniques used in attacks that we recently analyzed:

  • Attackers used HLFL as element type in the malicious RTF attachment. This element is not supported in RTF official specification but serves as an effective obfuscation for static detections.

  • Similarly, we have seen attackers using ATNREF and MEQARR elements in malicious RTF attachments.

In most of the attacks we analyzed, the exploits used PowerShell to download and execute malware payloads, which are usually crimeware samples like ransomware or info stealers.

Figure 6. PowerShell payload from the HTA file

However, every now and then, we stumble upon an interesting piece of malware that particularly catches our attention. One such malware is Wingbird, also known as FinFisher, which was used in one of the targeted attacks using the CVE-2017-8759 exploit.

WingBird (also known as FinFisher)

Wingbird is an advanced piece of malware that shares characteristics with a government-grade commercial surveillance software, FinFisher. The activity group NEODYMIUM is known to use this malware in their attack campaigns.

The group behind WingBird has proven to be highly capable of using zero-day exploits in their attacks, as mentioned in our previous blog post on CVE-2017-8759. So far, we have seen the group use the exploits below in campaigns. These are mostly in line with the findings of Kaspersky Labs, which they documented in a blog:

  • CVE-2015-5119 (Adobe Flash)
  • CVE-2016-4117 (Adobe Flash)
  • CVE-2017-8759 (Microsoft Office)
  • CVE-2017-11292 (Adobe Flash)

The interesting part of this malware is the use of spaghetti code, multiple virtual machines, and lots of anti-debug and anti-analysis techniques. Due to the complexity of the threat, it could take analysts some time to completely unravel its functionality. Heres a summary of interesting tidbits, which we will expand in an upcoming detailed report on Wingbird.

The Wingbird malware goes through many stages of execution and has at least four VMs protecting the malware code. The first few stages are loaders that can probe if it is being run in virtualized or debugged environments. We found at least 12 different checks to evade the malwares execution in these environments. The most effective ones are:

  • Sandbox environment checks

    • Checks if the malware is executed under the root folder of a drive
    • Checks if the malware file is readable from an external source and if execution path contains the MD5 of its own contents

  • Fingerprinting check

    • Checks if the machine GUID, Windows product ID, and system Bios are from well-known sources

  • VM detection

    • Checks if the machine hardware IDs are VmBus in case of HyperV, or VEN_15AD in case of VMware, etc.

  • Debugger detection

    • Detects debugger and tries to kill it using undocumented APIs and information classes (specifically ThreadHideFromDebugger, ProcessDebugPort, ProcessDebugObjectHandle)

The latter stages act as an installation program that drops the following files on the disk and installs the malware based on the startup command received from the previous stage:

  • [randomName].cab –Encrypted configuration file
  • – The last PE code section of the setup module; content still unknown
  • d3d9.dll –Malware loader used on system with restricted privileges; the module is protected by a VM
  • aepic.dll (or other name) – Malware loader used on admin privileged systems; executed from (and injected into) a faked service; protected by a VM
  • msvcr90.dll – Malware loader DLL injected into explorer.exe or winlogon.exe process; protected by a VM
  • [randomName].7z – Encrypted network plugin, used to spy the victim network communications
  • wsecedit.rar – Main malware dropped executable, protected by a VM

In the sample we analyzed, the command was 3, which led the malware to create a global event, 0x0A7F1FFAB12BB2, and drop malware components under a folder located in %ProgramData%, or in the %APPDATA% folder. If the malware is running with restricted privileges, the persistence is achieved by setting the RUN key with the value below. The name of the key is taken from the encrypted configuration file.

Value: “{Random value taken from config file}”

If the startup command is 2, the malware copies explorer.exe in the local installation directory, renames d3d9.dll to uxtheme.dll, and creates a new explorer.exe process that loads the malware DLL in memory using the DLL sideloading technique.

All of Wingbirds plugins are stored in its resource section and provide the malware various capabilities, including stealing sensitive information, spying on internet connection, or even diverting SSL connections.

Given the complex nature of the threat, we will provide more detailed analysis of the Wingbird protection mechanism and capabilities in an upcoming blog post.

Detecting Office exploit attacks with Office 365 ATP and Windows Defender Suite

Microsoft Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection blocks attacks that use these exploits based on the detection of malicious behaviors. Office 365 ATP helps secure mailboxes against email attack by blocking emails with unsafe attachments, malicious links, and linked-to files leveraging time-of-click protection. SecOps personnel can see ATP behavioral detections like below in Office 365s Threat Explorer page:

Figure 7. Office 365 ATP detection

Customers using Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection can also see multiple alerts raised based on the activities performed by the exploit on compromised machines. Windows Defender Advanced ATP is a post-breach solution that alerts SecOps personnel about hostile activity. Windows Defender ATP uses rich security data, advanced behavioral analytics, and machine learning to detect attacks.

Figure 8. Windows Defender ATP alert

In addition, enterprises can block malicious documents using Windows Defender Exploit Guard, which is part of the defense-in-depth protection in Windows 10 Fall Creators Update. The Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature in Windows Defender Exploit Guard uses a set of built-in intelligence that can block malicious behaviors observed in malicious documents. ASR rules can also be turned on to block malicious attachments from being run or launched from Microsoft Outlook or webmail (such as Gmail, Hotmail, or Yahoo!).

Figure 9. Windows Defender Exploit Guard detection

Crimeware and targeted activity groups are always on the lookout for attack vectors to infiltrate systems and networks and deploy different kinds of payloads, from commodity to advanced implants. These attack vectors include Office exploits, which we observed in multiple attack campaigns. The availability of open-source and off-the-shelf exploit builders helps drive this trend.

AtMicrosoft, we dont stop working to protect our customers mailboxes. Our global network of expert research teams continuously monitors the threat landscape for new malware campaigns, exploits, and attack methods. Our end-to-end defense suite includes Office 365 ATP, Windows Defender ATP, and Windows Defender Exploit Guard, among others, which work together to provide a holistic protection for individuals and enterprises.

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Detecting reflective DLL loading with Windows Defender ATP

November 13th, 2017 No comments

Today’s attacks put emphasis on leaving little, if any, forensic evidence to maintain stealth and achieve persistence. Attackers use methods that allow exploits to stay resident within an exploited process or migrate to a long-lived process without ever creating or relying on a file on disk. In recent blogs we described how attackers use basic cross-process migration or advanced techniques like atom bombing and process hollowing to avoid detection.

Reflective Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) loading, which can load a DLL into a process memory without using the Windows loader, is another method used by attackers.

In-memory DLL loading was first described in 2004 by Skape and JT, who illustrated how one can patch the Windows loader to load DLLs from memory instead of from disk. In 2008, Stephen Fewer of Harmony Security introduced the reflective DLL loading process that loads a DLL into a process without being registered with the process. Modern attacks now use this technique to avoid detection.

Reflective DLL loading isnt trivialit requires writing the DLL into memory and then resolving its imports and/or relocating it. To reflectively load DLLs, one needs to author ones own custom loader.

However, attackers are still motivated to not use the Windows loader, as most legitimate applications would, for two reasons:

  1. Unlike when using the Windows loader (which is invoked by calling the LoadLibrary function), reflectively loading a DLL doesnt require the DLL to reside on disk. As such, an attacker can exploit a process, map the DLL into memory, and then reflectively load DLL without first saving on the disk.
  2. Because its not saved on the disk, a library that is loaded this way may not be readily visible without forensic analysis (e.g., inspecting whether executable memory has content resembling executable code).

Instrumentation and detection

A crucial aspect of reflectively loading a DLL is to have executable memory available for the DLL code. This can be accomplished by taking existing memory and changing its protection flags or by allocating new executable memory. Memory procured for DLL code is the primary signal we use to identify reflective DLL loading.

In Windows 10 Creators Update, we instrumented function calls related to procuring executable memory, namely VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect, which generate signals for Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP). Based on this instrumentation, weve built a model that detects reflective DLL loading in a broad range of high-risk processes, for example, browsers and productivity software.

The model takes a two-pronged approach, as illustrated in Figure 1:

  1. First, the model learns about the normal allocations of a process. As a simplified example, we observe that a process like Winword.exe allocates page-aligned executable memory of size 4,000 and particular execution characteristics. Only a select few threads within the Winword process allocate memory in this way.
  2. Second, we find that a process associated with malicious activity (e.g., executing a malicious macro or exploit) allocates executable memory that deviates from the normal behavior.

Figure 1. Memory allocations observed by a process running normally vs. allocations observed during malicious activity

This model shows that we can use memory events as the primary signal for detecting reflective DLL loading. In our real model, we incorporate a broad set of other features, such as allocation size, allocation history, thread information, allocation flags, etc. We also consider the fact that application behavior varies greatly because of other factors like plugins, so we add other behavioral signals like network connection behavior to increase the effectiveness of our detection.

Detecting reflective DLL Loading

Lets show how Windows Defender ATP can detect reflective DLL loading used with a common technique in modern threats: social engineering. In this attack, the target victim opens a Microsoft Word document from a file share. The victim is tricked into running a macro like the code shown in Figure 2. (Note: A variety of mechanisms allow customers to mitigate this kind attack at the onset; in addition, several upcoming Office security features further protect from this attack.)

Figure 2. Malicious macro

When the macro code runs, the Microsoft Word process reaches out to the command-and-control (C&C) server specified by the attacker, and receives the content of the DLL to be reflectively loaded. Once the DLL is reflectively loaded, it connects to the C&C and provides command line access to the victim machine.

Note that the DLL is not part of the original document and does not ever touch the disk. Other than the initial document with the small macro snippet, the rest of the attack happens in memory. Memory forensics reveals that there are several larger RWX sections mapped into the Microsoft Word process without a corresponding DLL, as shown in Figure 3. These are the memory sections where the reflectively loaded DLL resides.

Figure 3. Large RWX memory sections in Microsoft Word process upon opening malicious document and executing malicious macro

Windows Defender ATP identifies the memory allocations as abnormal and raises an alert, as shown in Figure 4. As you can see (Figure 4), Windows Defender ATP provides context on the document, along with information on command-and-control communication, which can allow security operations personnel to assess the scope of the attack and start containing the breach.

Figure 4. Example alert on WDATP

Microsoft Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection protects customers against similar attacks dynamic behavior matching. In attacks like this, SecOps personnel would see an Office 365 ATP behavioral detection like that shown in Figure 5 in Office 365s Threat Explorer page.

Figure 5. Example Office 365 ATP detection

Conclusion: Windows Defender ATP uncovers in-memory attacks

Windows 10 continues to strengthen defense capabilities against the full range of modern attacks. In this blog post, we illustrated how Windows Defender ATP detects the reflective DLL loading technique. Security operations personnel can use the alerts in Windows Defender ATP to quickly identify and respond to attacks in corporate networks.

Windows Defender Advanced ATP is a post-breach solution that alerts SecOps personnel about hostile activity. Windows Defender ATP uses rich security data, advanced behavioral analytics, and machine learning to detect the invariant techniques used in attacks. Enhanced instrumentation and detection capabilities in Windows Defender ATP can better expose covert attacks.

Windows Defender ATP also provides detailed event timelines and other contextual information that SecOps teams can use to understand attacks and quickly respond. The improved functionality in Windows Defender ATP enables them to isolate the victim machine and protect the rest of the network.

For more information about Windows Defender ATP, check out its features and capabilities and read about why a post-breach detection approach is a key component of any enterprise security strategy. Windows Defender ATP is built into the core of Windows 10 Enterprise and can be evaluated free of charge.


Christian Seifert

Windows Defender ATP Research


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